DEFENDER-ATTACKER MODELS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN INFORMATION SECURITY

Today, information security in defender-attacker game models is getting more attention from the research community. A game-theoretic approach applied in resource allocation study requires security in information for successive defensive strategy against attackers. For the defensive side players, allocating resources effectively and appropriately is essential to maintain the winning position against the attacking side. It can be possible by making the best response to the attack, i.e., by defining the most effective secure defensive strategy. This present work develops one defender – two attackers game model to determine the defensive strategy based on the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg leadership equilibrium solutions of one defender-one attacker game model. Both game models are designed and studied in two scenarios: simultaneous and sequential modes. Game modes are defined according to the information that is available for attackers. In the first one, the defender is not aware of the attack and makes a simultaneous decision of how many resources should be allocated. Meanwhile, in the second mode, the defender knows about the entrance of attackers into a market and is assumed to commit a better strategy. The budget constraints are studied for both modes, all calculations and proof are presented in the work. According to obtained game mathematical models, it can be highlighted that network value of customers is important through the introduction of new variables in modeling and performing game theory equilibriums. This paper underlines the importance of information availability, budget limitations, and network value of customers in resource allocation through mathematical models and proofs; and focuses on modeling and studying defender-attacker games to define defensive strategy.