Redistricting Commissions

Abstract Redistricting commissions represent a significant innovation in American election law. By shifting power away from state legislatures and toward entities specially designed to draw electoral lines, proponents hope to unlock the potential of institutional change. Born of reform across numerous jurisdictions, these commissions reflect a wide diversity of structures and features. Some of the most important differences involve how commissioners are selected, how much autonomy each commission exercises, and the rules governing each entity’s internal voting processes. Scholars have examined these legal differences and their implications for redistricting. They have also explored, more broadly, the normative underpinnings of these reforms as well as commissions’ empirical outputs. Notwithstanding this rich body of scholarship, trends dominating American politics, including those associated with rising polarization, have outpaced the literature in potentially important ways. At least three related phenomena—the threat of partisan capture, the variable durability of reform, and the inherent limitations of commissions—complicate the work of commissions and their potential going forward and, accordingly, warrant further examination.