The “Death March” of Bonaparte’s Army of Orient to Damanhour on 3—9 July 1798

The military historians of Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign of 1798—1801 traditionally paid attention mainly to the fighting during this campaign. The author of the article suggests exploring also, in accordance with the latest approaches of military historical anthropology, events what happened at the same time “beyond the edge of the battlefield”. He analyzes the facts related to the first great march of Bonaparte’s Army of Orient across the desert from Alexandria to Damanhour on July 3—9, 1798, which became for French soldiers actually a “death march”. The first serious test for the Army of Orient revealed those fundamental problems for it, which, gradually worsening, would lead to the collapse of the entire expedition. It turned out that, the French were extremely poorly prepared for conducting military operations in desert conditions. Bonaparte, when deciding on the direction of movement of troops, was guided by purely ideological cliches about the willingness of the Egyptians to support the French as “liberators” from the yoke of the Mamluks and, believing the advice of representatives of local elites, sent the army along the most unfavorable route. The French soldiers demonstrated also utterly low readiness to act in extreme natural conditions: they quickly lost their morale and began to show disobedience to commanders. As a result of the combined impact of all these factors, the Army of Orient suffered during this march irretrievable non-combat losses, far exceeding its losses in the subsequent series of battles.