The Empathetic Emotions in the History of Philosophy

Abstract This volume is concerned with theories of emotions that can be described as empathetic ones, either because they presuppose the human capacity for empathy or because they are essential to how empathy operates. By looking at how philosophers in the history of Western philosophy from Ancient Greece up to the twentieth century have understood these emotions, it becomes possible not only to gain a deeper understanding of certain empathetic emotions and their relation to the concept of empathy, but also to see how these emotions are placed within a broader moral, social, or religious context. Taking into account this context is essential when it comes to engaging with such issues as whether sympathy provides an adequate basis for a theory of human sociability and fellowship, how compassion and pity play key roles in moral life and in the formation of the practical identities of human beings, roles that have been both positively and negatively evaluated, and whether the altruistic character and concern for others that have traditionally been ascribed to certain emotions can be reconciled with competing values such as self-love and the self-directedness of its concerns.