Phases of Objects

Abstract All material objects should be treated like children. A child can cease to be a child without ceasing to exist. That is what happens when it grows into an adult. Similarly, a clay statue can cease to be a statue without ceasing to exist, which is what happens when it is squashed into an amorphous lump; a car can cease to be a car without ceasing to exist, which is what happens when it is crushed into a block of scrap metal; and so on. This view is called phasalism, and it is not widely held. Contemporary metaphysics is dominated by the view that material objects are permanent members of various sorts or kinds in the following sense: not only does each material object belong to a certain kind throughout its career; it cannot cease to belong to that kind without thereby ceasing to exist. This book challenges the reigning paradigm by spelling out a phasalist metaphysics of material objects in great detail, highlighting its virtues, and defending it against objections. In the course of carrying out this ambitious project, the author defends a novel criterion of identity for material objects, a novel approach to solving coincidence puzzles about material objects, and a novel account of sameness relations. In the final chapter, he draws out and defends some of the controversial consequences of this phasalist metaphysics in the area of personal identity.