Grenzprobleme of Phenomenology: Metaphysics

AbstractWith the publication of theHusserlianaseries and Heidegger’sGesamtausgabeboth nearing completion, a strikingly different picture of their work than was available to earlier generations is emerging. It has become quite clear that phenomenological philosophy is not a fixed “system” but an ongoing philosophical practice that has much to contribute to debates in contemporary philosophy generally. It would be impossible here to canvass all the “horizons” of phenomenology that this situation has opened up, so in this chapter I will focus on one issue that Husserl considered to be aGrenzproblemof his phenomenology, namely, the relation between transcendental-phenomenological method (the “reduction”) and metaphysics. Section 1 presents an overview of my understanding of transcendental phenomenology as concerned specifically with clarifying issues of normatively structured meaning (Sinn). Section 2 argues that transcendental phenomenology is metaphysically neutral and considers an ambiguity in Husserl’sIdeasI that suggests the possibility that it is actually a metaphysical idealism – specifically, the claim that real things “depend” on consciousness for their existence. Section 3 takes up three accounts of this dependence-question and argues that only one of them takes full account of Husserl’s own views on metaphysics. Finally, in section 4, I argue that Husserl’s metaphysical “monadology” is based on dialectical arguments rather than on phenomenological evidence, and I suggest that it thus becomes the antinomical mirror-image of Theodore Sider’s metaphysical realism.