Foucault igazságkoncepciója

The aim of this paper is to elucidate Foucault’s concept of truth. It is a common misconceptionthat Foucault’s archaeology regarded reality as a social construct, and that his concept of the‘truth regime’ renders truth derivative of power and that it disables these analyses to show upany potential for emancipation. I am going to argue that Foucault’s investigations into the struc-ture of epistemes and truth regimes leave questions regarding the structure of reality open – hishistorical-diagnostic method is metaphysically neutral in this respect. Archaeology studies thehistorical transformation of reason, the genealogical study of truth regimes investigates theways in which epistemic and other practices exist in co-dependency. I am going to argue thatthe problem of the forms of subjectivity pose a unique problem in the economy of po-wer/knowledge, because only power relations are capable of constituting subjects, and, for thisreason, power and knowledge are articulated on each other in a unique way in those disciplineswhich deal with and form human subjects – for these two aspects always go together. I am goingto assert that this does not mean that emancipation is impossible, because genealogy is able toidentify local points of resistance in the network of power, and the historical-diagnostic methodis able to show that the forms of subjectivities these subjects are endowed with are contingentand are related to political technologies. This way, genealogy opens up the future.