Common Notions in the Ethics

Abstract Chapter 4 focuses on Spinoza’s account of reason and common notions introduced in the Ethics, and interprets common notions as an expression of the degree of agreement in nature between the individual and the external causes that determine it. After some preliminaries in Section 4.2, Section 4.3 introduces the conceptual machinery relevant to the notions of parts and wholes, and agreement in nature that Spinoza presents in Letter 32. Section 4.4 argues that this mereological account of parthood and the notion of agreement in nature underpin his discussion of reason in the Ethics. Section 4.5 contends that this reading of reason in terms of agreement in nature leads to a better understanding of his distinction between universal and proper common notions. Section 4.6 presents some alternative readings of his account of reason in the Ethics, and possible objections that might be raised against the interpretation developed in this chapter.