Embodiment and Language

The concept of embodiment is used in cognitive science and linguistics in a number of different ways. A common denominator is the emphasis on the active role of the living body—and not just the brain—in constituting key features of human cognition and language, and to include this in explanations of cognitive and linguistic structures. Most approaches to embodiment acknowledge phenomenological philosophy, and especially the work of Merleau-Ponty, as a key source of inspiration. Embodiment theories are typically formulated in opposition to dualism, where mind is categorically distinct from the body, and theories that assume that cognition and language operate on the basis of abstract inner representations and/or computations, as in cognitivism (e.g., Fodor) and generativism (e.g., Chomsky). At the same time there are ongoing debates among proponents of the embodiment thesis on its scope (e.g., “radical” versus “moderate embodiment”) and interpretations. Many of these debates concern traditional debates such as whether embodiment primarily involves conscious experiences versus unconscious processes, and universal (pan-human) aspects of cognition/language or (culture) specific ones. The term “embodiment” is also used in over-extended senses, where the “body” in question is that of artifacts or cultural practices. These senses are currently handled under related but distinct notions such as “extended mind” and “embedded/situated cognition.” The current entry limits its scope to embodiment via the living/lived human body, thus also omitting embodiment research in robotics. Another limiting principle, given that the article falls under linguistics, is to focus on citations that deal with language, directly or indirectly. Finally, gestures and non-verbal bodily communication are not dealt with as a separate topic, but only when relevant for other topics including Embodiment and Evolution and Embodiment in Development.