Hans Albert a kritická racionalita

The article is devoted to the philosophy of Hans Albert, focusing primarily on his concept of critical rationality. Albert systematically developed critical rationalism as a methodological framework that rejects traditional dogmatic systems and definitive certainties. In my article, I distinguish several levels of rationality in Albert’s thinking: from the theoretical and scientific level through to the ethical dimension and up to the problem of the meaning of life. I consider fallibilism, i.e. the assumption that human knowledge is always open to criticism and revision and can therefore never achieve absolute certainty, to be the main assumption of Albert’s epistemology. In the area of science, Albert advocates a rationality founded on logical consistency and empirical testability, while understanding science as a key means of examining reality. He also applies critical rationality in ethics, where he proposes an approach of “critical metaethics,” which allows for a rational discussion of ethical systems and their revision based on empirical consequences. On the question of the meaning of life, Albert emphasizes that meaningfulness is the result of individual decision-making within the framework of limited human conditions. In my conclusion, I point out the places where Albert’s approach intersects with the approaches of Jürgen Habermas, Hilary Putnam and Alasdair MacIntyre.