On Strawson ‘s Naturalistic Turn

Abstract It is customary when considering Strawson ‘s philosophical outlook to categorize him as a Kantian, and understandably so: Strawson ‘s The Bounds of Sense is one of the most influential studies of Kant ‘s first Critique; his use of transcendental arguments in that work and in his earlier book Individuals is clearly inspired by Kant; and Strawson ‘s opposition to certain kinds of empiricism and anti-philosophical scientism (the former embodied for him by Ayer and the latter by Quine) appears to reflect Kant ‘s own hopes for his transcendental philosophy, as offering a ‘third way ‘ between these and a rationalistic traditional metaphysics. Above all, perhaps, it has been assumed that it is in relation to the problems posed by scepticism that Strawson is close to Kant, in attempting to undercut the sceptical position by showing that it rests on a questionable underlying assumption (for example, that inner sense is possible without outer sense, or that first-person experience is possible without experience of others), and that once the fallaciousness of this assumption is exposed, the sceptical position can be rebutted.