Swinburne on Faith and Belief

Abstract In Faith and Reason1 Swinburne sets out an ambitious and impressive account of religious faith and the epistemology thereof, one that is based on a general account of belief and of rational belief in particular. In this chapter I will take issue with his general theory of belief, arguing that it is untenable. I will also make a few remarks on his discussion of the rationality of belief, but, though I do have some rather serious reservations about this account, I will refrain from going into them in detail. Since I will have given what I take to be conclusive reasons for rejecting Swinburne’s account of the nature of belief, I feel called upon to consider what modifications, if any, this demands in his admirably balanced, acute account of religious faith. Fortunately, so far as I can see, little change is called for. Aside from some minor rewriting, the treatment of faith survives unscathed the demise of the general theory of belief on which it is putatively based.