Elections and Their Alternatives

The article examines the criticism that is expressed in contemporary academic literature regarding the institution of political elections. With reference to the works of van Reybrouck, Achen and Bartels, it is demonstrated that elections cannot always be considered as an expression of the will, opinion or interests of the people, often do not contribute to effective and legitimate government, as well as to the selection of sufficiently conscientious rulers. At the same time, the defense of the political elections, which Adam Przeworski proposes from the standpoint of the minimalist concept of democracy, is considered. The Przeworski's claims are questioned that (1) elections ensure the turnover of the government, (2) the election result itself already demonstrates the existing balance of forces, making violence unnecessary, (3) the settlement of differences through elections entails much less costs and risks for the disputing parties than violent confrontation and (4) in conditions of everyone's equal right to vote, political elections force the government to “react” to the aspirations of the people. Next, the author considers three main alternatives to elections that are proposed in the academic literature, namely such methods of selecting the ruling elite as meritocracy, epistocracy and a lottery. The first method is considered using the example of the views of D.A. Bell, the second - J. Brennan, the third - van Reybrouck. It is concluded that both the effectiveness and legitimacy of lottery and political meritocracy, as well as limited suffrage (epistocracy) as more or less elitist models of government, can be regulated. Moreover, many of the disadvantages that are inherent in these methods of selecting the political elite are also inherent in elections. The general conclusion is that alternatives to elections have their own disadvantages, but they can well be used as an addition to the elections, and if used correctly, even replace elections.