Travis on Frege, Kant, and the Given

Travis thinks my view that there is a myth, the Myth of the Given, to be avoided is based on a conception that would entail that our conceptual capacities cannot make contact with the non-conceptual. I explain why he is mistaken. I explain why he is wrong to connect the supposed Myth with an idea he finds in Kant, the idea that there must be a match in form between our thoughts and what we think about. I take issue with his suggestion that something fundamental to Kant is contradicted by Frege’s insistence that thoughts are not put together out of self-standing building-blocks. And I argue that he misreads Frege about how something non-sensible ‘unlocks the outer world’ for us, about the relation between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, and about the possibility of conceiving thoughts as, not objects, but contents of sensory consciousness.