The Passions as Original Existences

Hume’s thesis that reason and passion cannot be opposed depends in part on his defense of the claim that because passions do not represent, they cannot oppose the representations, or beliefs, that reason yields. Hume’s characterization of the passions as “original existences,” which do not refer to anything outside of themselves, is remarkable. For it does seem, contrary to Hume’s other words, that passions have intentionality and make reference to their objects; it also appears that Hume is inconsistent, since he explicitly depicts indirect passions as having objects. Chapter 4 vindicates Hume’s view of the passions as having objects, but without making reference to them, and shows that while Hume has both a phenomenal and a structural conception of passion, each is appropriate for its own context. It also examines in what sense passions can be thought “reasonable.”