Belgium

Abstract Belgium is almost prototypical of the Continental European system of corporate governance. Not only are there few companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange (only 140 in 1999 on the first market, a reduction compared to 1990 when 182 were listed), but these companies also have a highly concentrated ownership structure. As in France, Italy, and Spain, financial and industrial holding companies hold a voting majority in the average company (Becht and Roell, 1999). As in Germany, industrial firms also hold large shareholdings in other listed and unlisted companies. Usually, complex ownership structures-with holding companies as intermediate investment vehicles-are used to lever control (Goergen and Renneboog forthcoming). The ultimate owner is often a family. This implies that Belgium can be portrayed as a Franco-German ‘insider system’ rather than an Anglo-American corporate governance system (Crama et al. 1999; Becht and Mayer 2001).