THERE ARE COALITIONS EVERYWHERE

ABSTRACT Do members of the committees under the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) find that there are coalitions of specific member states in these committees? If so, then what kind of side payments hold these coalitions together? For the first time in scholarly literature, and based on an empirical investigation, the findings in this paper document that two opposing coalitions – with the United Kingdom and France as the respective leaders – exist in OMC committees where mutual learning is the raison d’être. In the existing theory on this subject in the EU, it is claimed that consensus decision-making leads to a weakening of coalition-building. All three committees analysed in this paper build on consensus decision-making, which is achieved after intensive meetings between all the members. However, it is contended that the ‘argumentative contest’ working method of the OMC committees leads to more – not less – coalition-building. On the basis of a test, it is also shown that these committees are primarily held together by side payments in the form of ‘promises relating to policy among the like-minded’; however, ‘payments allied to subsequent decisions’ add to the cement of the coalition-building processes stemming from the OMC working method.