Search engine for discovering works of Art, research articles, and books related to Art and Culture
ShareThis
Javascript must be enabled to continue!

Chance Debugged

View through CrossRef
A ‘Big Bad Bug’ threatens Lewis’s Humean metaphysics of chance (Lewis 1986a, p. XIV); his Principal Principle provides an intuitive link between chance and credence. Yet on the one hand, certain future developments are incompatible with the true theory of chance, but on the other hand, such future developments have a positive chance to occur. The combination of these two claims with the Principal Principle leads to inconsistent credences. I present a Humean solution to the Bug: chances are relative to a limited perspective. The perspective comprises facts available as evidence to an ideal cognizer at a point in space-time. As a consequence, the same future event can have different chances of occurring provided the perspective is different. I show how this dissolves the Bug.
Title: Chance Debugged
Description:
A ‘Big Bad Bug’ threatens Lewis’s Humean metaphysics of chance (Lewis 1986a, p.
XIV); his Principal Principle provides an intuitive link between chance and credence.
Yet on the one hand, certain future developments are incompatible with the true theory of chance, but on the other hand, such future developments have a positive chance to occur.
The combination of these two claims with the Principal Principle leads to inconsistent credences.
I present a Humean solution to the Bug: chances are relative to a limited perspective.
The perspective comprises facts available as evidence to an ideal cognizer at a point in space-time.
As a consequence, the same future event can have different chances of occurring provided the perspective is different.
I show how this dissolves the Bug.

Related Results

La perte de chance
La perte de chance
Consacrée à la fin du 19ème siècle, la perte de chance n'est autre qu'un préjudice visant à réparer 1 disparition de la probabilité de constater la réalisation d'un évènement favor...
From Lewisian Chance to Humean Chance
From Lewisian Chance to Humean Chance
Abstract This chapter introduces David Lewis’ highly influential views on objective chance, from his 1980 treatment of objective chance and the Principal Principle (...
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance
Accuracy, Deference, and Chance
Chance both guides our credences and is an objective feature of the world. How and why we should conform our credences to chance depends on the underlying metaphysical account of w...
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance
Abstract David Lewis’s influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the foll...
Avicenna's Aristotelian Account of Chance
Avicenna's Aristotelian Account of Chance
Abstract: Interpreters have long been puzzled about how Avicenna's account of chance is compatible with his causal determinism. In this article, the author first shows that the mai...
Convex Approximations of Chance Constrained Programs
Convex Approximations of Chance Constrained Programs
We consider a chance constrained problem, where one seeks to minimize a convex objective over solutions satisfying, with a given close to one probability, a system of randomly pert...
Forecasting suppression of invasive sea lamprey in Lake Superior
Forecasting suppression of invasive sea lamprey in Lake Superior
Abstract Resource managers frequently are tasked with mitigating or reversing adverse effects of invasive species through management policies and actions. In Lake Superior, of th...

Back to Top