The Impact of Oil Production and Consumption on the Balance of Power

- My research examines how states can exercise power through oil. What kind of balancing strategies they use to maintain or improve their power. I use quantitative data and the case studies of USA, Japan and USSR/Russia to research the question. - The novelty of my research is enhanced by the international relations theory it applies to try to come up with answers: Neoclassical realist theory. - The neoclassical realist approach incorporates both systemic stimuli (such as neorealism) when analysing a policy response, but it incorporates other variables such as leader perception, strategic culture, etc. as well in order to have a better explanatory power. - The case of oil and balance of power is more optimal if it involves unit level variables into the research as well, because the systemic forces cannot solely explain the policy responses of states and their international outcomes. As all realist theories, neoclassical realism also considers international relations and politics as a struggle for influence and power where the resources are finite in a world of uncertainty about each state’s intentions and capabilities. - The macro-periods that I divided my research are distinct from each other by their characteristics: 1918-1945: The period between the end of the First World War and the end of the Second World War. This timeframe is very much different from the post 1945 world and shows the early conquest of oil. 1945-1973: After the Second World War the balance of power shifted tremendously and the era of the Cold War deserves its own macro-period in my research. This is the era of cheap oil. 1973-1998: The end of cheap oil, the fall of the Soviet Union and the Bipolar World signals a new chapter in the international relations. Furthermore, this is the era of the decline of conventional oil sources in the USA. 1998-Present: The post 9/11 world and the increasing relevance of non-state actors in the international relations. The Middle East, a significant oil-producing region moves to the forefront of attention. The introduction of shale oil. - H1. Every Great Power had access to the majority of the proved oil reserves since the Industrial Revolution. In the case of H1. I aggregated the available data in Table 19. to show the distribution of reserves in the proposed macro periods. In the case of H1. I found enough evidence to conclude that this hypothesis is correct. - H2. Ensuring access to crude oil influences the foreign policy of Great Powers. The less oil resource one state has control over, the more its foreign policy is focused on it. In the macro periods, historical examples and with the case studies I did not find enough supporting evidence for H2. Furthermore, in the case of the United States and Russia I found several contradictory actions that show: even oil rich states focus their foreign policy around the access to oil. H2. can only be correct when a Great Power has control over abundant oil sources, there is a short period of disruption of oil supply (or the crisis does not impact the global oil production) furthermore, it has enough surplus reserves that can boost production and there are direct or indirect means of increasing daily oil production independent of the crisis. - H3. Great Powers try to maintain and/or improve their place in the international system through balancing strategies. When Great Powers cannot maintain access to oil supplies in order to keep their power projection capabilities at a similar level as other Great Powers, they lose their status of being one. With the historical examples of the UK, France and the Japanese case study, I showed how the maintenance of access to oil through balancing strategies is an inevitable part of being a tier 1 Great Power. The loss of their rank supported H3. The case of Russia showed that even with high accessibility to oil sources, it is an insufficient criterion to be considered a tier 1 Great Power.