An Indefinibilist-cum-Substantivist Account of Truth and the Marks of Truth

Philosophers and logicians have expended enormous effort upon the determination of the extension of the concept of truth. Remarkable discoveries have resulted. A different and no less important question is this: what are the marks of that concept? “Deflationists” and their various allies will regard any such approach to truth as sadly mistaken—and Tarski’s famous paper itself (they may say) illustrates this. Here, however, they misread Tarski, who saw himself as adding to the non-deflationary account of truth offered by his own teacher, Kotarbinski. The chapter seeks then to enumerate the marks of truth. Truth is the first and foremost dimension of assessment for beliefs, statements or utterances. Secondly, if s is true then s will under favourable circumstances command convergence. Thirdly, if s is true then s has a content which can be accepted or contested. Fourth (a mark which is wide open to misunderstanding) every truth is true in virtue of something. Finally, from Frege, “truth is the goal”—a claim pregnant surely with practical-cum-political import, or so history suggests. Think of the disasters which history reminds us have been attendant upon its neglect.