Glasgow’s Reply to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer

Abstract In Chapter 4, Joshua Glasgow argued that race in the ordinary sense is defined in such a way that race cannot be a social construction and is not a biological reality. That chapter concluded with the claim that either race is not real, or if it is, it is real in a very basic way that is not captured by social or biological facts. In this chapter, Glasgow develops his view by responding to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer. After first clearing up some misconceptions about racial anti-realism, Glasgow explains how his argument against constructionism applies to Haslanger’s and Jeffers’s specific constructionist theories. He then explores how Spencer’s view is exposed to a mismatch objection and further argues that it faces additional problems of accounting for some central kinds of communication. This chapter also includes an Appendix that explores how a wide methodological ground is shared among the theories presented in this book.