The Conception of Metaphysics in de Deo and Its Implications

This chapter discusses the metaphysical prerequisites of Spinoza’s theory of the human mind. Starting from the position that, rather than proposing a rational theology, Part One of the Ethics establishes some sort of general ontology, it is argued, first, that, by maintaining substance monism, Spinoza is committed to the realist claim that being is conceivable, or explainable. Next, the chapter argues for a reconstruction of the terms “substance” and “mode” as establishing a categorical distinction between two sorts of entities. By using these terms in the peculiar manner in which he does, Spinoza does not assume an inherent relation between God and things but posits a categorical, insurmountable difference between them. This position is corroborated by a particular reading of Spinoza’s accounts of modality and causality. The chapter concludes by discussing what it means, for humans, to be modes: they are, by definition, dependent beings, and irreducibly so.