Unraveling the anthropological-existential significance of transcendental propositions

Kant labels his transcendental propositions as “principles” instead of mathematical “theorems” because they have the quite peculiar property of “making possible their ground of proof (Beweisgrund), namely experience”. The paper introduces an original reading. Importantly, this reading does not conflict with established interpretations, as it does not touch on the core focus of Kant's first Critique—examining the possibility of cognition (Erkenntnis). The emphasis is on the anthropological sense of Kant's key question: “What is man?” The proposal suggests that “possible experience” can be anthropologically understood as the possibility of understanding ourselves as human beings. Our understanding of ourselves dispenses with concepts made a priori, such as mathematical and formal ones. In contrast, without categories (and thus without transcendental propositions), we cannot comprehend ourselves as inhabitants of a world of persistent objects and events that interact causally in space and time. According to this interpretation, a “synthetic a priori proposition”, in Kant's view, is one whose truth depends on the world, not conceptual relations. Nonetheless, it is a priori in a quite specific sense—it is essential for our understanding as human beings.