Research on the Evolution of Collusion between Government and Civil Construction Enterprises in Environmental Regulation

Polluting civil construction enterprises usually use the way of "voting with their feet" to exert influence on the efforts of local government's environmental regulation, promote the formation of collusion between government and enterprises, and make the local government relax the supervision on the emission behavior of civil construction enterprises. Based on the Tibert model, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to study the collusion between government and enterprises in the cross regional migration of civil construction enterprises and its prevention. The results show that: when the civil construction enterprises comply with the production, the local government's optimal strategy is non collusion strategy; similarly, when the local government is not willing to collude, the non-collusion choice of civil construction enterprises will get higher benefits than collusion. In addition, the cost of civil construction enterprises transferring between different regions, the loss caused by the collusion between civil construction enterprises and local governments, and the probability of local government violations being found can effectively prevent the collusion between local governments and civil construction enterprises.