But is it Charity?

Abstract Numerous disparate injunctions have been lumped under a notion of argumentative charity. I shall argue that almost all these injunctions neither are, nor follow from, a principle of Charity. Rather they are better construed as instances or consequences of two other principles which I shall call Accuracy and Respect, neither of which should be construed as Charity. At best, Charity will have a narrow role to play when Accuracy and Respect underdetermine possible argument interpretations, i.e., when there are multiple interpretations that satisfy both Accuracy and Respect. Finally, I shall explore what happens when Accuracy and Respect conflict such that no viable interpretation emerges. I shall argue that conflict cases still do not require Charity, but may require interpretive Humility. Ultimately, I shall conclude that since Accuracy and Respect are doing the bulk of the interpretative work, we should focus first and foremost on being accurate and respectful interpreters.