Shared Thought and Communication

Abstract On a Fregean view of communication, communication requires shared sense. On a Russellian view of communication, it requires only shared reference and fulfillment of what I call ‘transactional requirements’. Firstly, I argue that the Fregean view is dialectically unstable, for reasons not usually discussed. However, even among those who demure from the Fregean view of communication, hesitation to embrace a Russellian view is common. My second aim is to ask whether this is justified. I do this by introducing a third option, relationism about communication, by outlining the central commitment shared by relationists and Fregeans, and by providing a way to ask if it is legitimate. If it is, then the relationist third option provides a way to avoid the Russellian view. If not, traditional dissatisfaction with a Russellian view of communication may be undermotivated.