Javascript must be enabled to continue!
Why didn't you scream? Epistemic injustices of sexism, misogyny and rape myths
View through CrossRef
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women. The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018. Four men, two of whom were well-known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine-week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention. The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across Northern Ireland. Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally. One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences. The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths. I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice. To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault.
Title: Why didn't you scream? Epistemic injustices of sexism, misogyny and rape myths
Description:
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss rape myths and mythologies, their negative effects on rape and sexual assault complainants, and how they prejudicially construct women qua women.
The backdrop for the analysis is the Belfast Rugby Rape Trial, which took place in 2018.
Four men, two of whom were well-known rugby players, were acquitted of rape and sexual assault in a nine-week criminal trial that dominated local, national and international attention.
The acquittal resulted in ‘I Believe Her’ rallies and protests across Northern Ireland.
Of concern were the deeply sexist and misogynistic text exchanges among the acquitted about the complainant and women more generally.
One month after the trial, the Criminal Justice Board of Northern Ireland commissioned an independent review of the arrangements to deliver justice in cases of serious sexual offences.
The Gillen Review proposed 16 key recommendations, among them measures to dispel rape myths and the role that Relationship and Sex Education in schools could play in combatting these myths.
I will explore these issues using Miranda Fricker's construction of epistemic injustice.
I argue that there is little appreciation of the profound impact that routine testimonial injustice—where the credibility of a speaker is deflated or undermined on account of her social identity—can have on the wellbeing of speakers and how it ramifies with other forms of injustice.
To illustrate, I draw on neurological explanations to show why attributions of sexual consent are unjustly sustained in cases of rape and sexual assault.
Related Results
High School Students' Adherence to Rape Myths and the Effectiveness of High School Rape-awareness Programs
High School Students' Adherence to Rape Myths and the Effectiveness of High School Rape-awareness Programs
Over the past 15 years, the emergence of date rape as a social problem has resulted in college campuses implementing rape education or awareness programs. Simultaneously, researche...
Epistemic extensions of substructural inquisitive logics
Epistemic extensions of substructural inquisitive logics
Abstract
In this paper, we study the epistemic extensions of distributive substructural inquisitive logics. Substructural inquisitive logics are logics of questions ...
Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
AbstractIs logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for ...
Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation
Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation
AbstractThis paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a ...
The Political Economy of Rape and Prostitution
The Political Economy of Rape and Prostitution
The status of women as property is shown to be reflected in and reinforced by the social and legal perceptions of rape and prostitution in the United States. Rape laws and their en...
Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry
Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry
AbstractEpistemologists have posed the following puzzle, known as the proof paradox: Why is it intuitively problematic for juries to convict on the basis of statistical evidence an...
The Roles of the Buddha in Thai Myths: Reflections on the Attempt to Integrate Buddhism into Thai Local Beliefs
The Roles of the Buddha in Thai Myths: Reflections on the Attempt to Integrate Buddhism into Thai Local Beliefs
This article aims at identifying the roles of the Buddha in Thai myths in order to explain how the Thai were able to integrate Buddhism into their indigenous beliefs. Certain myths...
Deepfakes and the epistemic apocalypse
Deepfakes and the epistemic apocalypse
AbstractIt is widely thought that deepfake videos are a significant and unprecedented threat to our epistemic practices. In some writing about deepfakes, manipulated videos appear ...