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The Foundations of Constitutional Punishment

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The recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata once again shows that analysis of the constitutionality of punishment tends to be reactive by focusing on constitutional violations. This traditional approach is attractive for several reasons, making it easy to understand why scholarship and case-law have insisted on the search for standards to guide findings of constitutional violations. The Constitution gives legislatures and administrations considerable amplitude in deciding what and how to punish. However, the traditional approach adds, the powers to criminalize and punish are not unlimited. What precise boundaries the Constitution sets for punishment then becomes the central question, one usually answered in terms of due process and Eighth Amendment violations. Considered in this light, the question of punishment invites a perspective focused almost exclusively on conditions of unconstitutionality rather than on the constitutional foundations of punishment as a legitimate state practice. This article integrates these two perspectives, giving primacy, however, to the question of the foundations of constitutional punishment. The difference in approach I take to the question of punishment under the Constitution may seem too nuanced to count. However, below the surface, the difference in focus translates into tectonic doctrinal, normative, and practical consequences. The inquiry developed in these pages articulates the foundations of punishment as a legitimate constitutional practice of self-governing citizenries. I argue that legitimate punishment rests upon a fivefold foundation: first, constitutional practice must take constitutional ownership of punishment as coerced-vulnerability; second, state violence in the form of punishment must be conceived as cruelty-free and practiced under this regulative ideal; third, respect for individuals as the embodiment of human dignity must be affirmed through punishment; fourth, this affirmation of human dignity through punishment demands that it be based on morally justified penological objectives; finally, illegitimate punishment must be fully redressable and adequate preventative remedies must be available. Constitutions that institutionalize punitive violence in a way consistent with these foundations meet the necessary, although not yet the sufficient, conditions of legitimate constitutional punishment. Part I presents an analysis of current reactive constitutional punishment doctrine in the Supreme Court. This analysis explains the difficulties encountered in existing conceptions of punishment, cruelty, and the substance of the right against cruel punishment, including corresponding remedies. Part II articulates and defends alternative conceptions of punishment, cruelty, right, and remedies. In this proactive approach, punishment centers on its coerced-vulnerability aspect, rejecting alternative (textualist, experiential, and motivational) understandings. Cruelty is redefined in its combined objective and subjective elements in order to capture impersonal causes as well as a broader spectrum of mental and sentient states. This modified understanding of cruelty informs a value conception of individual rights in the context of punishment as protection of the dignity embodied in each and every person. This value conception of right is contrasted to the “will” and “interest” conceptions dominant in the reactive approach to punishment under the constitution. The article then discusses ex ante and ex post facto remedial mechanisms. The focus of the article is in finding a clear path for legitimate dispensation of punishment consistent with liberal-democratic constitutions.
Elsevier BV
Title: The Foundations of Constitutional Punishment
Description:
The recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Plata once again shows that analysis of the constitutionality of punishment tends to be reactive by focusing on constitutional violations.
This traditional approach is attractive for several reasons, making it easy to understand why scholarship and case-law have insisted on the search for standards to guide findings of constitutional violations.
The Constitution gives legislatures and administrations considerable amplitude in deciding what and how to punish.
However, the traditional approach adds, the powers to criminalize and punish are not unlimited.
What precise boundaries the Constitution sets for punishment then becomes the central question, one usually answered in terms of due process and Eighth Amendment violations.
Considered in this light, the question of punishment invites a perspective focused almost exclusively on conditions of unconstitutionality rather than on the constitutional foundations of punishment as a legitimate state practice.
This article integrates these two perspectives, giving primacy, however, to the question of the foundations of constitutional punishment.
The difference in approach I take to the question of punishment under the Constitution may seem too nuanced to count.
However, below the surface, the difference in focus translates into tectonic doctrinal, normative, and practical consequences.
The inquiry developed in these pages articulates the foundations of punishment as a legitimate constitutional practice of self-governing citizenries.
I argue that legitimate punishment rests upon a fivefold foundation: first, constitutional practice must take constitutional ownership of punishment as coerced-vulnerability; second, state violence in the form of punishment must be conceived as cruelty-free and practiced under this regulative ideal; third, respect for individuals as the embodiment of human dignity must be affirmed through punishment; fourth, this affirmation of human dignity through punishment demands that it be based on morally justified penological objectives; finally, illegitimate punishment must be fully redressable and adequate preventative remedies must be available.
Constitutions that institutionalize punitive violence in a way consistent with these foundations meet the necessary, although not yet the sufficient, conditions of legitimate constitutional punishment.
Part I presents an analysis of current reactive constitutional punishment doctrine in the Supreme Court.
This analysis explains the difficulties encountered in existing conceptions of punishment, cruelty, and the substance of the right against cruel punishment, including corresponding remedies.
Part II articulates and defends alternative conceptions of punishment, cruelty, right, and remedies.
In this proactive approach, punishment centers on its coerced-vulnerability aspect, rejecting alternative (textualist, experiential, and motivational) understandings.
Cruelty is redefined in its combined objective and subjective elements in order to capture impersonal causes as well as a broader spectrum of mental and sentient states.
This modified understanding of cruelty informs a value conception of individual rights in the context of punishment as protection of the dignity embodied in each and every person.
This value conception of right is contrasted to the “will” and “interest” conceptions dominant in the reactive approach to punishment under the constitution.
The article then discusses ex ante and ex post facto remedial mechanisms.
The focus of the article is in finding a clear path for legitimate dispensation of punishment consistent with liberal-democratic constitutions.

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