“I Was(n’t) Born Yesterday”: Hermes Argues it Both Ways in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes

This talk analyzes two of Hermes’ speeches within the Homeric Hymn to Hermes as a means of exploring the relationship between speeches in the hymn and fifth- and fourth-century sophistic theory and forensic oratory. Kennedy (1963) and Görgemanns (1976) have noted the rhetorical sophistication of Hermes, particularly his use of arguments from eikos (one of the most popular argumentative techniques to arise among the sophists) in his defense speeches to Apollo and Zeus; Clay (1989) speaks broadly of “the rhetoric of Hermes” as being “persuasive, seductive, and deceptive” (106). This talk will delve into one particular aspect of Hermes’ oratory that has received little attention: Hermes’ strategy of arguing his case in opposite ways for two different audiences. This argumentative flexibility makes Hermes a literary precursor to the sophists, with their simultaneously playful and culturally-threatening experiments with notions of truth in persuasion (cf. discussions of Hermes’ sophistry in the matter of oaths in Fletcher (2008), Gagarin (2007), and Clay (1989)); and to forensic orators, with their exploitation of individual audience susceptibilities. The two speeches under examination are Hermes’ reply to Maia’s complaint about his precocious behavior (H. Hermes 163-181), and his defense against Apollo’s accusation of theft (261-277). These speeches exemplify tactics of forensic oratory typically associated with the Classical era, e.g. the aforementioned argument from eikos, arguments offering incentives, arguments ridiculing the opponent for absurdities, and appeals to the speaker’s trustworthy character (êthos). Most notably, however, the two speeches show Hermes using diametrically opposed arguments for Maia and Apollo, with each speech calibrated to the individual addressee and situation. This links Hermes’ speech with the Dissoi Logoi (“opposed arguments”) tradition in sophistic instruction, first attested in a late-fifth century BCE treatise (Kennedy 1994:17), as well as with one of the three overarching aspects of rhetorical persuasion identified by Aristotle, namely taking into account the particular listener and “disposing the listener” accordingly (ton akroatên diatheinai pôs, Rhetoric I.2.3). Hermes’ opposite approaches to persuading Maia and Apollo are conveyed primarily through his self-presentation to these two interlocutors. This self-presentation forms the basis for his argument in each case. When Maia voices motherly concern that he is endangering himself by tempting the wrath of men and gods, Hermes responds that she should not speak to him as though he were a baby, ignorant of evil deeds (163-5). Here it is in Hermes’ best interest to paint himself as a worldly wise, confident, and mature young man, thereby allaying his mother’s anxieties and allowing him to continue his escapades. When Apollo accuses him shortly thereafter of stealing his cattle, however, Hermes plays the innocent: how could he be a cow-thief, he asks his brother, when he can do nothing more than sleep and drink his mother’s milk (265-8)? “I was born yesterday” (chthes genomên), he protests (273). Whether Hermes presents himself as “born yesterday” or as “not born yesterday” thus depends entirely on his addressee and rhetorical aim. Bibliography Clay, Jenny Strauss (1989), The Politics of Olympus: Form and Meaning in the Major Homeric Hymns (Princeton). Fletcher, Judith (2008), “A Trickster’s Oaths in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes,” AJP 129, 19-46. Gagarin, Michael (2007), “Litigant’s Oaths in Athenian Law,” in Sommerstein and Fletcher, eds., Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society (Exeter). Görgemanns, Herwig (1976), “Rhetorik und Poetik im homerischen Hermeshymnus,” in Görgemanns and Schmidt, eds., Studien zum antiken Epos (Meisenheim). Kennedy, George A. (1963), The Art of Persuasion in Greece (London). ___ (1994), A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton).