Muhammar Qaddafi: The Return of Assassination during the Reagan Years

This chapter covers the multiple efforts of the Reagan Administration to re-interpret and weaken the ban on assassination to pursue its preferred policy. The chapter shows how the Administration engaged in various forms of norm contestation challenging the remit, the meaning, and the validity of the ban. This contestation emerged as the Administration revamped the CIA’s role in cover operations in three main areas: the support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the arming and training of the ‘contras’ in Nicaragua, and counter-terrorism operations. To engage in these activities, while denying it was violating the ban, the Reagan Administration established various legal and political precedents. First, the Administration argued that counter-terrorism operations could not amount to assassination regardless of the target. Second, it argued that operations in self-defence could not amount to assassination. Third, it argued that US officials could not be accuse of violating the ban if not explicit demonstration of intent emerged. Finally, it argued that foreign leaders were not protected by the ban on assassination if they were present at a legitimate military target. These precedents permitted the Administration to attempt the assassination of Muhammar Qaddafi. They also permitted Administrations after Reagan’s to consider assassination a controversial but available option.