Clawbacks as Ransomware Deterrence

Every eleven seconds, a business is hit by a ransomware attack. These attacks are costly, both for the victim and for the economy writ large. Cybercriminals are estimated to have extorted $898.6 million from ransomware victims in 2023, and damage from these attacks costs the world over $20 billion each year. Current strategies for deterring ransomware attacks focus on increased cybersecurity defenses, discouraging ransom payments, and legal retaliation. Despite these efforts, ransomware attacks continue to rise in frequency and profitability. Clearly, current deterrence strategies are not working. This is not surprising, as they are predicated on idealist-not realistassumptions of the cyber ecosystem. This Paper is the first to propose a new strategy to deter ransomware attacks: clawbacks. Clawbacks-the government seizure of ransom money after a ransom is paid-are an excellent vehicle for reducing ransomware attacks because they lie at the crossroads of two major deterrence theories, deterrence by denial and retaliation. And clawbacks target the main driver of ransomware attacks, financial gain, to deter cybercriminals from attacking at all. Though complete deterrence may be impossible, this Paper will show how clawbacks can help slow or reverse the troubling growth in ransomware attacks.