Intelligence and Decision in 1938

Abstract This chapter explores Hitler’s and Chamberlain’s decisions to negotiate Czechoslovakia’s fate rather than fight for it, comparing their decision-making at comparable moments. European decision-making in the run-up to WWII was almost as dimly lit as in July 1914, but with one difference: professional intelligence organizations were involved. They helped only marginally. Hitler’s primary objectives from 1937 to 1938 were domestic. He knew he needed to build his military while subjugating his generals, who believed they, not he, were the guarantors of the state. France and Britain missed Hitler’s moves in these regards, so missed learning his practical plans for territorial aggression against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. Not knowing Hitler’s intelligence operations against his military, the Allies did not know to be skeptical of sources within the German military who thought they knew Hitler’s mind when they not; in fact, these sources were being positively manipulated. If Hitler thus gained repeated intelligence advantages in the run-up to Munich, Chamberlain won an intelligence advantage during those meetings. Afterward, most French officials and British citizens believed the problem of European order was not Britain’s failure to stand up for it or to understand and properly accommodate Hitler’s objectives; the problem was Hitler himself: he was lying about his territorial ambitions.