DESIGNING AN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION HUB FOR NUCLEAR-RELATED DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE

Background: Nuclear-related disputes, covering safeguards compliance, safety and security incidents, nuclear liability, and transboundary environmental harm, highlight a persistent deficit in international dispute resolution. Persons affected by nuclear risk frequently lack meaningful access to remedies, whereas states and operators often avoid litigation because of sovereignty sensitivities, fragmented jurisdiction, and the need to protect classified or commercially sensitive information. Existing fora and administrative processes provide only partial coverage and seldom integrate confidentiality with minimum procedural guarantees. This article, therefore, asks how an international mediation hub for nuclear-related disputes can be designed to deliver credible access to justice while safeguarding security-relevant information and maintaining trust among states, operators, and affected communities. Method: The study uses doctrinal and comparative legal analyses. It examines treaty regimes and general principles relevant to nuclear governance and dispute processing, including due process and participation standards, standing and admissibility, transparency and confidentiality, state responsibility, and pathways for the recognition of mediated settlements. It then compares procedural models from established international mediation and arbitration frameworks to identify design features that can be adapted to nuclear sensitivities. Sources include treaties, institutional rules, jurisprudence, state practice, and peer-reviewed scholarship. Results and Conclusions: The article proposes a blueprint for a specialized international mediation hub for nuclear-related disputes: a consent-based, non-adjudicative mechanism administered by an independent international secretariat and supported by a multidisciplinary roster of mediators and vetted technical experts. Rather than functioning as a court-adjacent extension of domestic adjudication, the hub is conceived as a complementary international interface that can process safeguards-related coordination disputes, nuclear safety and security coordination disputes, mixed public-private operational disputes, and participation-sensitive disputes under differentiated admissibility rules. The article’s original contribution lies in four design outputs: a typology of disputes linked to mediation-suitability criteria; a three-track intake model; a tiered confidentiality or public-interest protocol; and a differentiated enforceability model. Where settlement agreements are international and commercial in nature, the framework contemplates structured use of the Singapore Convention; where disputes are state-centered or public-law in character, implementation would rely on recorded settlements, monitoring clauses, and agreed conversion pathways into other procedures.