Challenging the right-hemisphere assumption in post-stroke pragmatics: largely comparable impairment profiles across lesion sides

Abstract Traditional views assume that pragmatic deficits after stroke, which compromise the interpretation of communicative intentions and non-literal meanings, follow damage to the right hemisphere (RHD), with left-hemisphere damage (LHD) primarily linked to aphasia and structural language impairment. To examine hemispheric contributions to post-stroke pragmatic profiles, we assessed 99 stroke patients (40 LHD, including 14 with aphasia of minimal-to-moderate severity; 59 RHD) and 60 healthy controls with the Assessment of Pragmatic Abilities and Cognitive Substrates (APACS). While stroke patients overall performed worse than controls, LHD and RHD profiles were largely comparable across three converging analyses: (1) permutation tests revealed no hemispheric differences except on the two tasks requiring expressive components (Interview and Figurative Language 2), which in turn lowered the composites (APACS Production and Total); (2) equivalence testing established equivalence for most measures, with only these same tasks and composites remaining inconclusive; and (3) unsupervised clustering did not group patients by lesion side. Theory of Mind was robustly associated with pragmatic performance in both groups, whereas structural language abilities related specifically to LHD performance and general cognition only to RHD. Excluding aphasic LHD patients strengthened the evidence for comparable profiles, indicating that aphasic LHD patients largely drove the residual differences. In conclusion, primary pragmatic impairment, especially in the receptive domain, emerged comparably after LHD and RHD, with the only residual LHD disadvantage limited to tasks demanding open verbal output. These findings challenge the assumption of right-hemispheric specialization for pragmatics, stressing the need for pragmatic assessment in all post-stroke patients.