ATTACKS ON CRITICAL CPS INFRASTRUCTURE

Smart grids, water treatment facilities, and industrial automation networks are examples of critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) infrastructure which provides the backbone to today's societal functions. The growing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) also means that the connected environments are subject to new and increasing security challenges – in which an IT security vulnerability becomes an OT security vulnerability with high consequences for physical harm. Enterprise data confidentiality dominates traditional security research, but there is a critical research gap in the recognition and understanding of how advanced and physics-aware attackers can interact with operational control loops using stealthy, data-driven attack approaches that don't generate typical network anomalies. To fill this void, this chapter systematically examines the changing CPS threat landscape and maps vulnerabilities on architectural layers of the Purdue Model. The methodology is based on a control-loop taxonomy which assesses cyber-dependent actions, including False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) and sensor replay maneuvers, and has been tested against prominent empirical case studies such as Stuxnet and the disruptions of the Ukraine power grid. Results of the key findings show that legacy OT protocols don't include the cryptographic strength needed to withstand coordinated multi-stage attacks, and that network-centric defenses don't detect anomalies at the physical state estimation layer. As such, the chapter is emphasizing the need for a paradigm change in the modern CPS defense that moves from traditional perimeter isolation to physics-aware intrusion detection systems and resilient and fault-tolerant control designs. In sum, this complete synthesis provides researchers, industrial engineers and policy makers with actionable technical advice to design next-generation secure-by-design critical infrastructure that will ensure Authors Ibrar Ahmed Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Noida Institute of Engineering and Technology Greater Noida, India Ibrarahmed@niet.co.in Surya Prakash Sharma Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Noida Institute of Engineering and Technology Greater Noida, India. suryaprakash.sharma@niet.co.in Dr. Mandeep Singh Katre Department of Computer Science Lingayas Vidyapeeth Faridabad, India mandeepkatre@gmail.com Nishu Niharika Department of Computer Science Noida Institute of Engineering and Technology, Greater Noida, India nishuniharika9884@gmail.com operational integrity in the presence of active exploitation.