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The Skeptic's Progress: Reordering Augustine's Early Dialogues

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Three dialogues at the start of Augustine's corpus purport to be transcripts of conversations held at Cassiciacum in 386. In an attempt to find the actual dates of these conversations, Ohlmann 1897 situated the events of De Beata Vita and De Ordine in a pause between Contra Academicos' first two books, i.e. CA1, DBV, DO, CA2-3. While most scholars no longer credit the works’ claim to historicity, Ohlmann's inherently implausible ordering has given rise to an ongoing project of dislodging and rearranging the dialogues' individual books. Cary 1998 and Foley 1999 have most recently argued for two different orderings, yet both build on the same basic assumption that the dialogues treat Skepticism as an obstacle simply to be overcome. Against this assumption, I argue that Skepticism plays simultaneously a positive and negative role in the dialogues. By recognizing this we may find an additional cross-reference between works which may settle the dispute over their narrative order. DBV and DO clearly follow CA1 (DO2.1 refers to DBV's debate, while at DBV13-16 Augustine argues against the Skeptical thesis defended by the young Licentius in CA1); the question is whether they follow it immediately. Foley argues for the order CA1-3, DBV, DO, on the grounds that Skepticism must be refuted before one turns to the later works' articles of Christian faith; Cary places DBV and DO directly after CA1, arguing that CA1 & DBV form a single protreptic, DO sets a course of liberal study, and CA2-3 removes Skepticism as an obstacle to that course. Despite their differences, both scholars arrange the dialogues in a progression away from Skepticism. When confronted with CA2.1's warning of two obstructions to the search for wisdom - the <i>superstitio</i> of wrongly thinking oneself wise and the <i>desperatio</i> of thinking wisdom unattainable - Foley and Cary thus argue for discreet stages, which, they claim, mirror Augustine's autobiography in the Confessions: one escapes (Manichee) superstition via Skepticism and then puts Skepticism aside before turning to faith / liberal study. In CA itself, however, we find superstition and despair held in continuing tension: Augustine shields his students from despair by refuting particular Skeptical theses yet simultaneously combats superstition by appropriating the Skeptics' rigorous standards for knowledge. Such rigorous standards are endorsed at CA2.28 where Skepticism's new spokesman Alypius chastises Licentius for his <i>puerilis leuitas</i> in abandoning the Skeptics' main theses at CA2.27 and argues that in allowing himself to be swayed by <i>una interrogatiuncula</i>, Licentius shows just how far he is from becoming wise. By DBV13-16 Licentius has taken this critique to heart and refuses to accept Augustine's apparently sound argument on the grounds that some Skeptic could easily counter such a <i>parua puerorum illecebra</i>. This reference requires placing DBV after CA2, thus making Ohlmann and Foley's already implausible reordering an impossibility. By setting the dialogues' order as CA, DBV, DO, we find Licentius deepening his commitment to Skeptical rigor [DBV13-16] ever after abandoning Skepticism’s main theses [CA2.27]. This does not constitute a set-back, as Foley and Cary would have us believe, but in fact shows Licentius moving forward in his search for wisdom. BeDuhn, Jason. Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E. Philadelphia, 2009. Bermon, Emmanuel. “<<Contra Academicos vel De Academicis>> (Retract. I, 1): Saint Augustin et les Academica de Cicéron” Revue des Études Anciennes 111/1 (2009) 75-93. Cary, Phillip S. “What Licentius learned” Augustinian Studies 29:1 (1998) 141-163. Conybeare, Catherine. The Irrational Augustine. Oxford, 2006. Doignon, Jean. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin: Dialogues Philosophiques: La Vie Heuruse. Paris, 1986. Foley, Michael. “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dailogues” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 45 (1999) 51-77. Fuhrer, Therese. Augustin: Contra Academicos Bücher 2 und 3. Berlin, 1997. Goldhill, Simon. The End of Dialogue in Antiquity. Oxford, 2008. Hirzel, Rudolf. Der dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch. Leipzig, 1895. Huebner, Wolfgang. “Der Ordo der Realien in Augustins Frühdialog De ordine” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 33 (1987) 23-48. Madec, Goulven. “L'historicité de Dialogues de Cassiciacum” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 32 (1986) 207-231. McWilliam, Joanne. “The Cassiciacum autobiography” Studia Patristica 17 (1990) 14-43. Meulenbroek, B. L. “The Historical Character of Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues” Mnemosyne 13 (1947) 203-29. O'Meara, Dominic. “Scepticism and Ineffibility in Plotinus” Phronesis 45/3 (2000) 240-251. O'Meara, John. “The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine” Vigiliae Christianae 5 (1951) 150-178. Ohlmann, Desiderius. De Sancti Augustini Dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis. Argentorati, 1897. Schlapbach, Karin. “Ciceronisches und Neoplatonisches in den Proömien von Augustin, Contra Academicos 1 und 2” in Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike, T. Fuhrer & M. Ehler, edd. Stuttgart, 1999. 139-51. Schlapbach, Karin. Augustin Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis) Buch 1 Einleitung und Kommentar. Berlin, 2003. Slings, S. R. “Protreptic in Ancient Theories of Philosophical Literature” in Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle, J. G. J. Abbenes, S. R. Slings & I. Sluiter, edd. Amsterdam, 1995. 173-192. Trelenberg, Jörg. Augustins Schrift De ordine. Tübingen, 2009. Voss, Bernd Reiner. Der Dialog in der Frühcrhistlichen Literatur. München, 1970. Van der Meeren, Sophie. “La sagesse <<droit chemin de la vie>>: une métaphore du Contra Academicos relue à la lumière du protreptique philosophique,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 53 (2007) 81-111.
Elsevier BV
Title: The Skeptic's Progress: Reordering Augustine's Early Dialogues
Description:
Three dialogues at the start of Augustine's corpus purport to be transcripts of conversations held at Cassiciacum in 386.
In an attempt to find the actual dates of these conversations, Ohlmann 1897 situated the events of De Beata Vita and De Ordine in a pause between Contra Academicos' first two books, i.
e.
CA1, DBV, DO, CA2-3.
While most scholars no longer credit the works’ claim to historicity, Ohlmann's inherently implausible ordering has given rise to an ongoing project of dislodging and rearranging the dialogues' individual books.
Cary 1998 and Foley 1999 have most recently argued for two different orderings, yet both build on the same basic assumption that the dialogues treat Skepticism as an obstacle simply to be overcome.
Against this assumption, I argue that Skepticism plays simultaneously a positive and negative role in the dialogues.
By recognizing this we may find an additional cross-reference between works which may settle the dispute over their narrative order.
DBV and DO clearly follow CA1 (DO2.
1 refers to DBV's debate, while at DBV13-16 Augustine argues against the Skeptical thesis defended by the young Licentius in CA1); the question is whether they follow it immediately.
Foley argues for the order CA1-3, DBV, DO, on the grounds that Skepticism must be refuted before one turns to the later works' articles of Christian faith; Cary places DBV and DO directly after CA1, arguing that CA1 & DBV form a single protreptic, DO sets a course of liberal study, and CA2-3 removes Skepticism as an obstacle to that course.
Despite their differences, both scholars arrange the dialogues in a progression away from Skepticism.
When confronted with CA2.
1's warning of two obstructions to the search for wisdom - the <i>superstitio</i> of wrongly thinking oneself wise and the <i>desperatio</i> of thinking wisdom unattainable - Foley and Cary thus argue for discreet stages, which, they claim, mirror Augustine's autobiography in the Confessions: one escapes (Manichee) superstition via Skepticism and then puts Skepticism aside before turning to faith / liberal study.
In CA itself, however, we find superstition and despair held in continuing tension: Augustine shields his students from despair by refuting particular Skeptical theses yet simultaneously combats superstition by appropriating the Skeptics' rigorous standards for knowledge.
Such rigorous standards are endorsed at CA2.
28 where Skepticism's new spokesman Alypius chastises Licentius for his <i>puerilis leuitas</i> in abandoning the Skeptics' main theses at CA2.
27 and argues that in allowing himself to be swayed by <i>una interrogatiuncula</i>, Licentius shows just how far he is from becoming wise.
By DBV13-16 Licentius has taken this critique to heart and refuses to accept Augustine's apparently sound argument on the grounds that some Skeptic could easily counter such a <i>parua puerorum illecebra</i>.
This reference requires placing DBV after CA2, thus making Ohlmann and Foley's already implausible reordering an impossibility.
By setting the dialogues' order as CA, DBV, DO, we find Licentius deepening his commitment to Skeptical rigor [DBV13-16] ever after abandoning Skepticism’s main theses [CA2.
27].
This does not constitute a set-back, as Foley and Cary would have us believe, but in fact shows Licentius moving forward in his search for wisdom.
BeDuhn, Jason.
Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma, 1: Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.
E.
Philadelphia, 2009.
Bermon, Emmanuel.
“<<Contra Academicos vel De Academicis>> (Retract.
I, 1): Saint Augustin et les Academica de Cicéron” Revue des Études Anciennes 111/1 (2009) 75-93.
Cary, Phillip S.
“What Licentius learned” Augustinian Studies 29:1 (1998) 141-163.
Conybeare, Catherine.
The Irrational Augustine.
Oxford, 2006.
Doignon, Jean.
Oeuvres de Saint Augustin: Dialogues Philosophiques: La Vie Heuruse.
Paris, 1986.
Foley, Michael.
“Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dailogues” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 45 (1999) 51-77.
Fuhrer, Therese.
Augustin: Contra Academicos Bücher 2 und 3.
Berlin, 1997.
Goldhill, Simon.
The End of Dialogue in Antiquity.
Oxford, 2008.
Hirzel, Rudolf.
Der dialog, ein literarhistorischer Versuch.
Leipzig, 1895.
Huebner, Wolfgang.
“Der Ordo der Realien in Augustins Frühdialog De ordine” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 33 (1987) 23-48.
Madec, Goulven.
“L'historicité de Dialogues de Cassiciacum” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 32 (1986) 207-231.
McWilliam, Joanne.
“The Cassiciacum autobiography” Studia Patristica 17 (1990) 14-43.
Meulenbroek, B.
L.
“The Historical Character of Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues” Mnemosyne 13 (1947) 203-29.
O'Meara, Dominic.
“Scepticism and Ineffibility in Plotinus” Phronesis 45/3 (2000) 240-251.
O'Meara, John.
“The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine” Vigiliae Christianae 5 (1951) 150-178.
Ohlmann, Desiderius.
De Sancti Augustini Dialogis in Cassiciaco scriptis.
Argentorati, 1897.
Schlapbach, Karin.
“Ciceronisches und Neoplatonisches in den Proömien von Augustin, Contra Academicos 1 und 2” in Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike, T.
Fuhrer & M.
Ehler, edd.
Stuttgart, 1999.
139-51.
Schlapbach, Karin.
Augustin Contra Academicos (vel De Academicis) Buch 1 Einleitung und Kommentar.
Berlin, 2003.
Slings, S.
R.
“Protreptic in Ancient Theories of Philosophical Literature” in Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle, J.
G.
J.
Abbenes, S.
R.
Slings & I.
Sluiter, edd.
Amsterdam, 1995.
173-192.
Trelenberg, Jörg.
Augustins Schrift De ordine.
Tübingen, 2009.
Voss, Bernd Reiner.
Der Dialog in der Frühcrhistlichen Literatur.
München, 1970.
Van der Meeren, Sophie.
“La sagesse <<droit chemin de la vie>>: une métaphore du Contra Academicos relue à la lumière du protreptique philosophique,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 53 (2007) 81-111.

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