Rethinking Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion in Pakistan through Constitutional Principles of Good Governance and the Modern Limits of the Wednesbury Doctrine

Administrative discretion is an unavoidable feature of the modern regulatory state, enabling public authorities to respond flexibly to complex and rapidly changing social, economic, and institutional circumstances. Yet, discretionary power also creates an inherent risk of arbitrariness, abuse, inconsistency, and infringement of fundamental rights. The law of judicial review has therefore developed as a mechanism for maintaining the constitutional balance between administrative autonomy and the rule of law. In common-law jurisdictions, the Wednesbury doctrine has traditionally represented a central standard for reviewing administrative discretion, permitting judicial intervention where a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have made it. Although the doctrine seeks to preserve institutional boundaries and prevent courts from substituting their own views for those of administrative authorities, its exceptionally high threshold has increasingly attracted criticism in the context of contemporary constitutionalism and rights-based governance. This article critically examines the continued relevance and limitations of the Wednesbury doctrine in Pakistan and argues that judicial control of administrative discretion should be reconceptualised through constitutional principles of good governance. It explores the relationship between administrative discretion, the rule of law, fundamental rights, constitutional accountability, proportionality, procedural fairness, legitimate expectation, and reasoned decision-making. The article contends that Pakistan's constitutional framework provides a normative foundation for a more structured and context-sensitive approach to judicial review. Rather than abandoning Wednesbury entirely, Pakistani courts should develop a calibrated model of review in which the intensity of judicial scrutiny corresponds to the nature of the administrative power, the statutory context, and the constitutional rights and interests affected. Such an approach would preserve appropriate administrative autonomy while preventing excessive deference from becoming a constitutional shield for arbitrary governmental action. The article concludes by proposing a constitutional good-governance model of judicial review based on legality, rationality, proportionality, procedural fairness, transparency, accountability, and effective remedies.