Color Primitivism and Neo-pragmatism

This chapter responds to criticisms raised by Jonathan Cohen, on behalf of reductionists, to the Benacerraf-style argument for color primitivism offered in Chapter One. The response stresses the fact that the argument for primitivism is perfectly consistent with the idea that some ostensively taught terms—terms for natural kinds, for example—refer to properties that have hidden essences that are the business of empirical science to determine. In this way, the Benacerraf-style argument is perfectly consistent with the idea that water is identical to H2O. The chapter also presents in much more detail the neo-pragmatism on which the book relies throughout. Rather than making the a priori assumption that descriptive language must function by making use of words that “latch on” via a substantive relation of reference to objects and properties out there in the world, the neo-pragmatist takes a more empirical view of language that reflects a deeper naturalism.