Perfection and Self-Perfection in Baumgarten and Kant

Abstract The debate on whether Kant’s duties of justice derive from the fundamental principle of morality akin to his ethical duties has persisted, with some scholars advocating the autonomy of Kantian justice from morality. However, this chapter contends that Kant closely follows Baumgarten, who perceives justice and ethics as integral components of a unified moral system. While Kant does not challenge Baumgarten on this, notable disparities exist between their perspectives. Baumgarten’s distinction between internal and external motives well explains why justice only concerns the duties of action, which Kant simply takes for granted without any acknowledgment. Additionally, Baumgarten’s definition of perfect duties as enforceable contrasts with Kant’s identification of non-coercively enforceable perfect duties that extend beyond the scope of justice. Kant’s argument on coercion hindering freedom reveals the underlying foundation of his moral philosophy, grounded in the normativity of freedom, distinguishing it from the perspectives of Baumgarten and other Wolffians.