Hedonism

This chapter aims to give a fairly comprehensive account of Epicurean hedonism, highlighting its philosophical interest and its complex relation to rival doctrines. Evidence is used from relatively unexplored sources, in particular Philodemus and Diogenes of Oenoanda, as well as from Epicurus, his early associates, and Lucretius. The discussion will bring out the distinctive nature of Epicurean hedonism, its originality and sophistication, and its enduring core as well as its peripheral developments over time. The topics discussed include the following: Epicurus’s conception of the moral end and his theory of motivation; Epicurus’s conceptual amplification and defense of his hedonism (especially the controversial distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, the claim that the removal of pain is the highest pleasure, and the respective roles of the body and the mind in the achievement of the supreme good); the Epicurean classification of desires and its ethical implications; and the unique importance of virtue in the rational pursuit of pleasure. Finally, the chapter considers some of the criticisms rehearsed by Cicero against Epicurean hedonism and discusses whether the Epicureans have sufficient resources to respond to them.