Interest Groups in International Intellectual Property Negotiations

This paper parts with the assumption that a perspective that takes interest group dynamics into account has great explanatory power for the interpretation of international intellectual property (IP) negotiation outcomes like TRIPS and ACTA. The research questions will consequently revolve around contextual conditions that affect the generation of different interest group systems, which in turn heavily influence the negotiation outcomes: Who exactly are today’s relevant interest groups in comparison to the TRIPS era and what are their stakes and interests? Why did they gain influence in the area of international IP policymaking and what are their strategies to exercise their influence? What implications does the changed interest group system have for international IP policy-making? What insights can be gained from the analysis of the TRIPS and ACTA negotiations about the role of interest groups in international IP negotiations? In order to allow a profound analysis of these research questions, the scope of this paper will be narrowed down to the case study of the European Union (EU) concerning two international IP negotiations: The TRIPS agreement, currently providing the status quo on minimum standards of IP rights and the ACTA negotiations. The EU has been chosen as the object of analysis, because the recent rejection of the ACTA agreement by the European Parliament seems contradictory to the pro-TRIPS standpoint and support for high international IPR standards that usually constituted the EU interest in international IP negotiations since the TRIPS negotiations 18 years ago. The hypothesis that will be tested with this paper is that certain contextual factors altered the EU interest group system concerning international IP politics in the time period between TRIPS and ACTA, which in turn considerably contributed to the transformation of the EU standpoint in international IP negotiations.