Donnellan’s misdescriptions and loose talk

The chapter aims at a new interpretation of Donnellan’s claim on the possibility of stating something true with a definite description that appears to be literally false (a misdescription). It presents some problems with Kripke’s account of referential misdescriptions and a strong version of Donnellan’s claims that clashes with Kripke’s interpretation. Next it discusses two versions of a strong inertness thesis aiming at justifying Donnellan’s strong claim. Then it reconsiders Donnellan’s argument against a Humpty Dumpty interpretation of his theory and interprets Donnellan’s work as an anticipation of a theory of loose talk, embedding his ideas in the current debate on the semantics–pragmatics interface. Finally it presents a weak inertness thesis (WIT) as an alternative to Recanati’s and Almog’s treatment of misdescriptions, and tries to defend and extend it and to hint at a “justificationist” version of it (PRODET).