Pictorial Realism

Regarding realism, Goodman says the following: “Realism is relative, determined by the system of representation standard for a given culture or person at a given time.”. “Realism is a matter of habit” [1, pp. 37–38]. “… reality in the world, like realism in a picture, is largely a matter of habit” [2, p. 20.] The relativist position expressed here, with its emphasis on the concept ‘habit,’ is reiterated by Goodman in many areas. We find it in each and every one of the subjects he dealt with, including the subject [3], to be discussed here, namely the problem of pictorial representation. Throughout the range of problems he considered, Goodman shows that the attribution of meanings to reality is an acquired habit, constituted by our exposure to history, culture and natural languages. Under different cultural-historical frameworks we would simply see in what is today considered as a nonrealistic painting, a depiction faithfully describing reality. Goodman leaves the ruling of a realism to the mercy of the cultural framework in which we live, and believes that habit alone is the final test for determining pictorial denotation: a picture is understood as denoting a particular scene from the moment we accustom ourselves to use a particular interpretative key, which is itself determined by tradition or even ad hoc. I attempt, in this article, to return the concept of habit to its usual, natural grounds, with the intent of proposing a contrasting approach to Goodman's. My aim is to prove that the attribution of a realistic meaning to a picture is the result of a natural and rational decision between a number of possible alternatives. Accordingly, a picture is considered realistic as long as it demands less information than the other possible alternatives, to draw similarity between it and the objects it depicts. Alongside the consolidation of my approach to realism, I will consider Goodman's parallel position according to which “to represent, a picture must function as a pictorial symbol; that is, function in a system such that what is denoted depends solely upon the pictorial properties of the symbol” [1, pp. 41–42]. I would like to show that by extracting the interpretation of a picture from its immediate and natural perception, and by requiring a sign system to elucidate it, Goodman ignores the natural and essential relationship between the artistic means deployed by the artist and what we eventually see in the picture. In his method, the same picture may denote a considerable number of alternatives since what it represents depends on the sign system currently in use. In order to prove my claim, I will present a number of studies within the framework of Gestalt psychology, and will harness them to dismiss the relativism which Goodman expounds in this matter.