The Case for Equality: On Frankfurt's On Inequality

Economic equality has long been regarded as morally important. Arguments for greater economic equality remain central to American political discourse. Now in a short highly readable book entitled "On Inequality," Harry G. Frankfurt, professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University, offers a brief meditation on what it means to value equality, and whether we should. Frankfurt advances two overarching claims: a normative claim that individuals should not favor economic equality, and a positive claim that equality is not an ideal of any intrinsic moral importance. Both of Frankfurt’s claims are worthy of serious consideration but both are flawed. On the normative side, Frankfurt seeks to establish that economic equality is not a value worth pursuing and that most people who favor economic equality should (or do in fact) favor sufficiency — that is, that society ensure that every person has enough material resources to lead a happy life. On the positive side, Frankfurt contends that equality has no underived moral worth, and that those who purport to favor equality do not in fact favor equality itself, but rather favor a society that ensures that individuals are treated with respect they deserve. This review sets out Frankfurt's arguments and points out some of their flaws. It then offers three reasons that we might regard economic equality as morally valuable in its own right. First, we might favor it if, as an empirical matter, it maximizes aggregate utility. Second, we might favor it if it is the most moral means of achieving other ends that we value. Third, we might favor it because we think no one should be able to have a certain level of material wealth unless everyone can have it. Frankfurt’s book is provocative but its conclusions miss the mark. Equality can be morally important even in circumstances in which everyone has enough or only some can.