Individualism and Universalism in Herder’s Conception of the Philosophy of History

Herder was very familiar with the concept of human rights (in his German, “Menschenrechte”), strongly shared the moral ideals of protecting people at which the concept aims, but tended to avoid using the concept himself. Why this ambivalence? The present article argues that a number of well-founded concerns about the concept underlie, or at least may underlie, his reservation, including concerns about the legal rather than moral nature of the very concept of “rights,” the undue restriction of the focus of “human rights” to protecting people against threats that emanate from their own governments rather than against those from outside (imperialism, colonialism, etc.) as well, and the concept’s dubious restriction of protections to human beings to the exclusion of animals. The article also argues, however, that these concerns are not insurmountable, and that indeed Herder himself has provided some of the most important theoretical tools for surmounting them.