La interrupción en el sistema de la absoluta objetividad de Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s realism is inseparable from the philosophical controversies in which he was involved. The most famous of them involves the Kantian “thing-in-itself”. However, Jacobi’s realism has to be interpreted also according to its relation to Spinoza’s philosophy. Starting from a passage of the novel Allwill, rarely studied and yet highly valued by Jacobi himself, we propose to explore Jacobi’s realism (the system of absolute objectivity) using the notion of “interruption” as a reference point. This notion allows us not only to decipher conceptual aspects of Jacobi’s thought, but also to understand the way in which he works concretely with written culture. The interruption of the pure emptiness of thought is, for Jacobi, the beginning of life (as free acting) expressed from the conditions of conceptual discourse, which are not really appropriate for such expressions.