Exit, Voice, and Hostility in Cuba

Albert Hirschman's categories of ‘exit,’ Voice,’ and ‘loyalty,’ which were previously applied to the analysis of emigration and protests in East Germany, are discussed and applied to the case of Cuba. Incentives for different types of action which may be derived from policy decisions regarding migration, as well as information and repression, are placed in the context of the strategic interaction between the United States and Cuban governments. A game-theoretic model of the typical Cold War conflict between the two former German regimes is compared with the US-Cuba interaction regarding migration policy. In spite of some coincidence between the two governments to prefer ‘exit,’ successive waves of emigration of people from Castro's Cuba to the United States in the period 1959–1995 have induced an increasing degree of cooperation between the two governments over time to close off borders. “Latin American powerholders have long encouraged their potential enemies and potential critics to remove themselves from the scene through voluntary exile.” Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 1970:60.