Concepts, abstractness, and inner speech

We explore the role of inner speech (covert self-directed talk) during the acquisition and use of concepts differing in abstractness. Following Vygotsky, inner speech results from the internalization of linguistically mediated interactions that regulate cognition and behaviour. When we acquire and processabstract concepts, uncertainties about word meaning might lead us to search actively for their meaning.Inner speech might play a role in this searching process and be differentially involved in concept learning compared to use of known concepts. Importantly, inner speech comes in different varieties – e.g., it can be expanded or condensed (with the latter involving syntactic and semantic forms of abbreviation). Do we useinner speech differently with concepts varying in abstractness? Which kinds of inner speech do we preferentially use with different kinds of abstract concepts (e.g., emotions vs. numbers)? What other features of inner speech, such as dialogicality, might facilitate our use of concepts varying in abstractness(byallowing us to monitor the limits of our knowledge in simulated social exchanges, through a process we term inner social metacognition)? In tackling these questions, we address the possibility that different varieties of inner speech are flexibly used during the acquisition of concepts and their everyday use.