Thinking1

Abstract The phenomenon of thinking has given rise to a great amount of philosophical puzzlement and controversy. Yet this itself seems paradoxical, since a classical philosophical view, extremely plausible to some and supported, I think, by certain of our ordinary, unreflective convictions, would seem to imply that thinking is among those matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy. So that, from a certain point of view, one may feel that the real philosophical puzzle about thinking is how there can be philosophical puzzles about it. How can a matter which is so clear to us be so unclear? Or does the fact of puzzlement and controversy all by itself refute one of the parties in the controversy: the one which maintains that thinking is among the matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy? It seems to me that even this is not clear! A vague and one-sided diagonsis of the situation at this point might be along the following lines.