Competing theories of eyewitness identification

Psychological researchers have put forward several theories of eyewitness identification behavior, each of which offers differing hypotheses relating to eyewitness memory and identification task difficulty. While earlier (informal) models of eyewitness identification behavior provide a sense of understanding in ways that are both intuitive and accessible, recently introduced formal (mathematical) models provide researchers with improved precision and the potential for strengthening theory via hypothesis testing. This paper describes two distinct formal model classes within the eyewitness identification theory set—continuous models and discrete-state models—and how each model set aligns with the existing informal models. I suggest that the theoretical conflict between these competing model sets has created an ethical dilemma between either viewing eyewitnesses as ‘fallible observers’ who act in good faith, or as ‘poor decision makers’ who cannot be trusted to provide evidence of any probative value. This a dilemma that must be resolved if we are to gain a better understanding of eyewitness identification processes.